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The 411 on 9/11: The 9/11 Commission Releases its Final Report
The 9/11 Commission released its final report to the public on July 22, 2004.
The report would not exist if it were not for many brave family members of 9/11 victims who pushed Congress and the White House to establish the Commission. The victims’ family members, like the rest of us, wanted answers to two pivotal questions: "How could 9/11 have happened?" and "How can we prevent it from happening again?"
The report concerns itself with these questions, investigating not only 9/11, but the evolution of terrorism; the first World Trade Center bombing; U.S. responses to al Qaeda before 9/11; failures in foreign policy, leadership, and intelligence prior to the attack; and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The report then presents a strategy for preventing future attacks, with one chapter on combating terrorists and another on reorganizing the U.S. government to be more efficient in dealing with the threat of terrorism.
The long wait for a commission
Just after 9/11, family members of the victims began demanding that Congress create a commission to investigate the attacks. Senators Joseph Lieberman (D) and John McCain (R) supported the idea and introduced legislation in December 2001.
The House of Representatives passed an amendment to the 2003 Intelligence Appropriations Act that created a bipartisan "blue ribbon" commission. (Only the House can appropriate the funds for such a commission.) The amendment passed by a vote of 219 to 188.
In September 2002, the Senate voted 90 to 8 to pass the Lieberman-McCain amendment that would establish a bipartisan commission to investigate the September 11 terrorist attacks. The Bush Administration initially opposed the amendment, but support for the amendment gained momentum as House-Senate Intelligence Committee hearings released new information on intelligence failures leading to the attacks.
In October 2002, the White House announced opposition to some of the specifics of the commission. The administration believed it should be allowed to appoint the chairman of the panel and objected to the number of votes needed for subpoena power, as well as to the duration and scope of the commission.
In November 2002, President Bush signed the Intelligence Authorization Act, which included a provision to create the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
Reactions to the report
Members of Congress, the Bush administration, and Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry agree that the report is invaluable. There is disagreement as to whether the recommendations should be adopted wholly or if Congress and the White House may choose some proposals and reject others. The Commission expects all of their suggestions to be adopted.
But only if the American public knows and understands these recommendations can Congress and the White House be held to that promise.
Of course, there is a substantial debate over the Commission’s suggestions, but the Commission has promised to engage in that debate in order to help lawmakers craft the best possible security and counterterrorism strategies. John Kerry has suggested that the Commission continue to work for another 18 months until all of the recommendations are implemented.
The 9/11 Commission - A bipartisan project
The 9/11 Commission is made up of five Republicans and five Democrats; during early hearings, Commission members seemed partisan. However, Commission members unanimously endorsed the report and claim to have worked well together despite party differences.
When asked how Commission members were able to rise above partisanship, Commission Chair Thomas Kean, who is a Republican, claimed that commissioners got to know one another personally, and that these friendships helped to create a constructive working environment. In addition, party differences were dwarfed by the importance of the Commission’s task: to clarify the past and to help make America safe for the future.
Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle were impressed by the Commission’s success; many said that they were inspired by this spirit of bipartisanship and hope to carry it to Congress. However, this will be difficult during an election year when each side is showcasing a different philosophy of government.
9/11 Commission’s findings - preparation needs imagination
After reviewing more than 2.5 million pages of documents and interviewing more than 1,200 people in ten countries, including top government officials, the Commission has concluded that the United States was unprepared for a terrorist attack prior to and on 9/11. This is not the fault of any one organization or administration, but rather, all systems of government failed. It would be too simple to blame a single organization or individual, since there was a lack of imagination throughout government; many agencies suffered from poor policy and management, U.S. efforts at diplomacy were weak, and military options were few.
The Commission also sites problems within the intelligence community - the FBI, CIA, and Defense Department - did not share information or coordinate with one another or with the Federal Aviation Administration or Immigration Service. Cooperation among these departments may have prevented 9/11. For this reason, the Commission recommends the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center and National Intelligence Director.
Reorganizing government
In its final report, the Commission explains that 15 government agencies are working on counterterrorism, but that there is no coordination or organization of their efforts. This is not a new criticism.
The Commission feels it is essential to synchronize counterterrorism projects and recommends a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which would coordinate the FBI, CIA, FAA, Immigration and Defense departments, and other agencies working with intelligence, terrorism, and security. The NCTC would also coordinate operations among these organizations.
In a Senate hearing immediately following the release of the final report, Chairman Kean explained that the Commission researched reorganization models from both the private and public sectors. Nevertheless, critics say that the plan is flawed. Many doubt that hiring a new ‘CEO of security’ of sorts will truly foster information sharing and coordination among intelligence departments.
The Commission fully expects the FBI and CIA to be resistant to reform. Little has changed within these organizations since the Cold War, and prior to 9/11, old-fashioned tactics were used to track al Qaeda and Usama Bin Laden. The Commission believes that the NCTC will move these agencies into the 21st century, helping them to organize against a threat that is multinational, flexible, resourceful, foreign, and domestic.
Who is the quarterback?
The Commission also recommends the creation of a new high-level position: A National Intelligence Director (NID) who would direct the NCTC and all counterterrorism efforts.
During its hearings, the Commission frequently asked witnesses about who was in charge of counterterrorism operations, "who was the quarterback?" they would inquire. The most typical answers were, "no one" or "the president."
The sports image may not work. Quarterbacks carry out the playbooks of the manager who is owned by people who put up money for the team. In a democracy, WomenMatter asks, "who is the owner?" Clearly citizens who vote are the owners. "Who is the manager and quarterback responsible to the citizens?" Only the president, not the NID, is elected.
The Commission reasoned that the president has too many obligations to coordinate the FBI, CIA, Defense Department, Department of Homeland Security, State Department, and National and Homeland Security councils. Further, having directors of these individual organizations is not enough; the commission feels we need a director of the directors.
Some fear that the NCTC and NID would create greater bureaucracy, but the Commission feels strongly that counterterrorism information and operations must be integrated.
The NCTC would not create policy, but would influence the leadership and budgets of counterterrorism projects in the CIA, FBI, and departments of Defense and Homeland Security.
Considering Congress
The Commission found that Congress has done little to oversee counterterrorism efforts. The report recommends a committee made up of both House and Senate members (called a joint committee) or a committee in each house of Congress that would review homeland security projects.
In addition to creating these committees, Congress is responsible for implementing the changes suggested by the 9/11 Commission. Both houses plan to draft and present related bills by early fall 2004. President Bush is also considering an Executive Order that would put into operation some of the Commission’s proposals.
Report critiques
Some fear that placing the NCTC in the Executive Office of the President, as the Commission suggests, consolidates too much power in the executive branch. In the first Congressional hearing on the report, Commission Chair Kean conceded that an imbalance of power is a problem to consider, but, logistically speaking, the NCTC needs to be in close communication with the president and should therefore be located in his or her executive offices.
U.S. Muslim groups have critiqued the report for failing to explore the connections between 9/11 and U.S. policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These groups also feel that the Commission should consider whether or not the war in Iraq has made the United States safer or more at risk.
Despite critiques, members of Congress and families of 9/11 victims have hailed the report. Many feel the Commission’s work is a first step towards a secure future.
Learn more
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Update Posted on: 8/5/2004
